Suchergebnisse

We study the impacts of idiosyncratic productivity shocks when: firms have asymmetric productivities; firms and unions bargain over wages; and firms decide employment. The efficient firm pays a higher wage but has lower marginal production costs (due to its productivity advantage). Profits and worker surplus are higher at the efficient firm. A positive productivity shock affecting the efficient firm is always welfare improving; while if affecting the inefficient firm it may be welfare detrimental (if consumers' gain does not compensate the loss in worker surplus and industry profit). Consumer surplus increases more when the productivity shock affects the inefficient firm.

ABSTRACTWe introduce asymmetric information about consumers' transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.

Abstract
We study the sustainability of collusion with optimal penal codes in markets where demand growth triggers the entry of a new firm. In contrast to grim trigger strategies, optimal penal codes make collusion easier to sustain before entry than after. This conclusion is robust to changes in the number of entrants and to the consideration of price-setting instead of quantity-setting. A comparison is given between different reactions of the incumbents to entry in terms of sustainability of collusion, incumbents' profits, entrant's profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. One of our findings is that the incumbent firms may prefer competition to collusion.